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Abstract
When agents are liquidity constrained, two options exist — sell assets or borrow. We compare
the allocations arising in two economies: in one, agents can sell government bonds (outside
bonds) and in the other they can borrow (issue inside bonds). All transactions are voluntary,
implying no taxation or forced redemption of private debt. We show that any allocation in
the economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy with outside bonds but that
the converse is not true. However, the optimal policy in each economy makes the allocations
equivalent.
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1 Introduction
In monetary economies, households often face binding liquidity constraints. In such situations,
they can acquire additional liquidity by selling assets or by borrowing. Several papers have studied
the case where households can sell nominal government bonds (outside bonds) for money while
others allow households to borrow money (issue inside bonds) to finance consumption.1 These
different methods for relaxing liquidity constraints raises the following question: following the logic
of Modigliani-Miller, do these alternative financing arrangements of household consumption lead
to equivalent allocations? Our focus in this paper is to address this question.
Within a common monetary framework, we consider two economies: one in which households
trade outside bonds and one in which they trade inside bonds. Two main results emerge from our
analysis. First, any allocation in the inside bond economy can be replicated in the outside bond
economy. The converse is not true. Second, if monetary policy is set optimally in both economies,
then the allocations are the same.
The key assumption for attaining these results is that all trades between private agents and
between private agents and the government must be voluntary. This implies that in the inside bond
economy, redemption of inside bonds must be voluntary. In the outside bond economy, it means
the government cannot impose a lump-sum tax on agents to redeem outstanding government debt.
In short, participation constraints must be taken into account.2
The key feature that makes the allocations equivalent across the two economies is the costs
associated with participating in financial markets. In the inside bond economy, if a household
defaults on its debt, it is excluded from trading in the financial market until it repays its debt. In
the outside bond economy, we assume the government can charge a fee to participate in the financial
market. If a household does not pay the fee, it is excluded from trading in the financial market.3
In this way, households face a similar participation decision in either economy — as to whether they
1Examples of the first method include Kocherlakota (2003), Shi (2005, 2008), Boel and Camera (2007) and
Marchesi and Senesi (2007). Examples of the latter include Aiyagari and Williamson (2000), Aykol (2004), Berentsen,
Camera and Waller (2007), and Diaz and Perrera-Tallo (2007).
2 In a recent paper, Kocherlakota (2007) emphasizes that many results in the literature rely on asymmetric
collection powers of private and government entities. To eliminate this asymmetry, we assume that all trades must
be voluntary. With this assumption we are ensuring that any differences in allocations that arise are not the result
of inherent differences in the collection powers across public and private entities.
3This idea is motivated in part by Andolfatto (2009) who looks at voluntary payment of fees to receive interest
on money.
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should incur a cost today (repay loans or pay the fee) to have access to future financial markets.
We show that for an arbitrary money growth rate, the allocation in the inside bond economy
can be replicated in the outside bond economy by an appropriate choice of the fee. In general,
the converse is not true. Hence, allocations can differ across the two economies. We then show
that in the outside bond economy it is optimal to have the government charge the maximum fee —
one that just makes an individual indifferent between participating in the financial market or not.
Under this policy, the outside bond economy allocation will always be equivalent to the inside bond
economy allocation.
At first glance this result seems counter-intuitive; most economists would probably argue that
imposing a tax to participate in the financial sector would inhibit trade and lower welfare, not
raise it. However, the result is actually quite intuitive. The intuition is as follows: Assume the
participation constraint in the outside bond economy is not binding. Then marginally raising the fee
does not deter agents from participating in the outside bond market, yet it allows the government
to extract money from the economy. This in turn reduces the inflation tax on money and raises its
return, which improves welfare.
In short, our results are an application of standard public finance theory: If lump-sum ‘taxes’
are available to the government, then it is optimal to use them to reduce distortionary taxes. Since
the participation fee is effectively a lump-sum tax, the government can improve welfare by using it
to the fullest extent and reduce the distortionary tax on money.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of related literature.
In Section 3, we describe the environment. Section 4 contains an analysis of the economy with
outside bonds. Section 5 examines the economy with inside bonds, and Section 6 compares the
allocations of the two economies. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our equivalence result is reminiscent of Wallace’s (1981) Modigliani-Miller type result for open
market operations. In an overlapping generation model, Wallace shows that the method for financ-
ing government spending, either by issuing money or holding interest-bearing real assets, does not
affect the equilibrium allocation. A critical element for proving his result is that the government
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has access to lump-sum taxation.
Our equivalence result is also related to recent papers by Kocherlakota (2007) and Hellwig
and Lorenzoni (2009). Kocherlakota considers various models of asset trade. In these models,
households can trade a privately issued one-period bond, a publicly issued one-period bond, or
publicly issued money. He proves that the allocations for these economies are equivalent.4 As
noted by Kocherlakota, it is crucial for these results to hold that the government and private
households have the same enforcement powers, implying the government has access to lump-sum
taxes and private lenders can force some repayment of loans. Moreover, in Kocherlakota’s model
money plays no transaction role. We obtain our equivalence result for economies with limited
enforcement and for environments where trade requires a medium of exchange.
Hellwig and Lorenzoni assume the same enforcement structure as we do. They compare two
economies: one with inside bonds and no enforcement of repayment and the other with unbacked
government debt (outside bonds). The latter means that the government cannot force households
to pay taxes, and households cannot force the government to redeem debt in real goods. They
show that the allocations in the two economies are equivalent — any allocation in the inside bond
economy can be replicated in the outside bond economy and vice versa. This is driven by the
fact that unbacked government debt in Hellwig and Lorenzoni’s model is simply fiat money, which
means that fiat money and government bonds are identical assets. In our framework money and
government debt have different liquidity properties, hence they are not identical assets.
Several further papers are related to what we do here. Kehoe and Levine (2001) compare
allocations in a dynamic economy when households can acquire consumption goods in one case by
selling their capital holdings and in another case by issuing debt subject to a borrowing constraint.
They show that if households are sufficiently patient, the allocations are the same in a deterministic
environment, but if they are sufficiently impatient, then the debt constrained allocation leads to
a better allocation. However, they study trade in real assets while we analyze trade in nominal
assets. Furthermore, they do not examine government policy in their economies whereas we do.
Shi (2008) examines the implications of illiquid bonds in a monetary search model where there are
legal restrictions preventing bonds from being used as a medium of exchange in some transactions
but not in others. The legal restrictions make outside bonds illiquid relative to money. He finds
4 In an earlier paper, Taub (1994) derived a related equivalence result between money and credit.
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that having illiquid bonds can be welfare improving. In Boel and Camera (2006), bonds are illiquid
in the sense that there is a transaction fee for converting them into cash. Since households have
different discount factors and trading opportunities, for some parameter configurations, there is
a welfare improving role for illiquid bonds under the optimal monetary policy. Marchesiani and
Senesi (2009) consider an economy where households with idle money holdings can buy illiquid
outside bonds. The government finances the interest payment through lump-sum taxes. They
show that the opportunity to buy interest bearing bonds is strictly welfare improving because it
allows households with idle money to save. Lagos and Rocheteau (2003) study the use of illiquid
bonds in a variant of the Lagos-Wright model. They find that under the optimal monetary policy
(zero inflation) illiquid bonds are inessential.5 Finally, the paper is also related to Andolfatto
(2009) and Hu, Kennan and Wallace (2009) who analyze the impact of participation constraints on
allocations arising in the Lagos-Wright framework.
3 The environment
The basic framework is the divisible money model developed in Lagos and Wright (2005). This
model is useful because it allows us to introduce heterogeneous preferences while still keeping the
distribution of money balances analytically tractable.6 Time is discrete, and in each period there
are three perfectly competitive markets that open sequentially. The first market is a financial
market where agents trade money for bonds. The second market is a goods market where they
trade money for market 2 goods. In the third market, agents produce and consume market 3 goods
and readjust their portfolios.
The economy is populated by two types of infinitely-lived agents: households and firms. Each
type of agent has measure 1. Households consume in market 2 and consume and produce in
market 3. Firms produce in market 2 and consume in market 3. A household’s consumption
utility in market 2 is εu(q) where ε is a preference shock and q consumption in market 2, with
u0(q), −u00(q) > 0 with u0(0) = +∞. The preference shock ε has a continuous distribution F (ε)
5Furthermore, there are a number of papers that study the coexistence of money and bonds (e.g. Diaz and Perrera-
Tallo (2007), Ferraris and Watanabe (2008), Sun (2007), and Telyukova and Wright (2008)). The key difference to
our work is that they never compare the allocative effects of different bonds.
6An alternative framework would be Shi (1997) which we could amend with preference and technology shocks to
generate the same results.
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with support [0, εH ], is iid across households, serially uncorrelated and has the expected value
ε¯ =
R εH
0 εdF (ε).
7 Firms incur a utility cost c(qs) = qs from producing qs units of output in
market 2. All trades in market 2 are anonymous, and trading histories in this market are private
information, thus no trade credit exists. Hence, there is a role for money, as firms require immediate
compensation for their production effort.
Following Lagos and Wright (2005), we assume that households in market 3 receive utility U(x)
from x consumption, with U 0(x),−U 00(x) > 0, U 0(0) = ∞, and U 0(+∞) = 0. They can also
produce these goods with a constant returns to scale production technology where one unit of the
consumption good is produced with one unit of labor h generating one unit of disutility.8 Firms do
not produce in this market but they can consume. Their utility of consuming y satisfies U(y) = y.
The discount factor across periods is β = (1 + r)−1 < 1 where r is the time rate of discount.
3.1 First-best allocation
We assume without loss in generality that the planner treats all firms symmetrically. He also treats
all households experiencing preference shock ε symmetrically. Given this assumption, the weighted
average of expected steady state lifetime utility of households and firms can be written as follows
(1− β)W = U (x) +
Z εH
0
[εu (qε)− hε] dF (ε) + y − qs. (1)
where hε is hours worked by a ε−household in market 3 and qε is consumption of an ε−household
in market 2. The planner maximizes (1) subject to the feasibility constraint
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε) ≤ qs. (2)
x+ y ≤
Z εH
0
hεdF (ε) (3)
7All of our results go through with a non-zero lower bound. Setting the lower bound of ε to zero simplifies the
presentation of the results.
8As in Lagos and Wright (2005), these assumptions allow us to get a degenerate distribution of money holdings
at the beginning of a period. The different utility functions U (.) and u (.) allow us to impose technical conditions
such that in equilibrium all agents produce and consume in the last market.
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The first-best allocation satisfies
U 0 (x∗) = 1 and
εu0 (q∗ε) = 1 for all ε. (4)
These are the quantities chosen by a social planner who could dictate production and consumption.
3.2 Outside bonds versus inside bonds
We analyze equilibria of the model under two different bond markets — a market for outside bonds
and one for inside bonds. Outside bonds are nominal government debt obligations, whereas inside
bonds are private debt obligations.
Outside bond economy In the outside bond economy, we assume a government exists that
controls the supply of fiat currency and issues one-period, nominal bonds. These bonds are perfectly
divisible, payable to the bearer and default free.9 One bond pays off one unit of currency at maturity.
The government is assumed to have a record-keeping technology over bond trades and bonds are
book-keeping entries — no physical object exists. This implies that households are not anonymous
to the government. Nevertheless, despite having a record-keeping technology over bond trades, the
government has no record-keeping technology over goods trades.
At time t, the government sells one-period, nominal discount bonds in market 3 and redeems
bonds that were sold in t− 1. At the start of t+ 1, the idiosyncratic shocks ε are revealed. Then
households trade bonds and money. The government acts as the intermediary for these trades,
recording purchases/sales of bonds and redistributes money.
Private households are anonymous to each other and cannot commit to honor inter-temporal
promises. Since bonds are intangible objects, they are incapable of being used as media of exchange
in market 2, hence they are illiquid. Since households are anonymous and cannot commit, a
household’s promise in market 2 to deliver outside bonds to a firm in market 3 is not credible.
Consequently, fiat money is essential for trade in market 2.
9The government has no incentive to default since it redeems its bonds by printing money at no cost.
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Inside bond economy Inside bonds are financial claims on private households, issued in a private
bond market. Consequently, issuing inside bonds is equivalent to receiving credit. We assume that a
perfectly competitive financial market exists where intermediaries have a record-keeping technology
over financial trades. Thus, while households are anonymous to each other, they are not anonymous
to financial intermediaries.10 In market 1 the intermediaries acquire nominal debt obligations from
borrowers and issue nominal debt obligations on themselves to depositors, which are securitized by
their acquired claims. In market 3 all debt obligations are settled. As with the government, we
assume intermediaries can commit to honor their debt obligations. No record-keeping technology
exists in the goods market, and promises to repay in the future are not credible, thus no trade
credit exists between households and firms in market 2.
Limited enforcement We consider economies where all trades must be voluntary. For the
outside bond economy, it means that the government cannot levy taxes on households.11 For the
inside bond economy, it means that repayment of debt must be voluntary — creditors have no power
to collect unpaid debts.
For a household, unpaid debt has two consequences. First, it receives no further loans until
the debt is repaid. Second, it cannot save by acquiring nominal debt obligations from the financial
intermediary, unless it repays any outstanding debt. These two assumptions imply that a household
that defaults on its debt is excluded from participating in future financial markets. Thus, repayment
of debt is the price for participating in future financial markets. Given these rules, we derive
conditions to ensure voluntary redemption and show that this may involve binding borrowing
constraints; i.e., credit rationing.
For the outside bond economy, although it cannot tax, the government can charge a participation
fee for trading in the bond market. Households that do not pay the fee cannot buy newly issued
government bonds nor trade in the secondary bond market. The government can do this because
outside bonds are intangible objects, and the trades amongst private households in the secondary
10An example is a bank that accepts nominal deposits and makes nominal loans. While the bank knows who it
trades with, borrowers do not know the identity of depositors and vice versa.
11The inability to impose lump-sum taxes occurs in environments with limited enforcement. In such environments,
all trades must be voluntary, and so lump-sum taxes of money are not feasible because the government cannot impose
any penalties on the agents. If it could impose such penalties, there would be no role for money since "producers
could be forced to produce for households" (Kocherlakota 2003, p. 185).
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bond market are executed by the government since it controls the record-keeping technology.12 As
a result, paying the fee is similar to repaying one’s debt — it is the price for participating in the
financial market.13
3.3 Government policy and the money supply process
In this section we describe the evolution of the money stock for each economy. In both economies
we assume that the government does not purchase any goods with money issuance or revenues
received from bond sales. This is without loss of generality.
Outside bond economy Denote Mt as the per capita money stock and Bt as the per capita
stock of newly issued bonds at the end of period t. Fiat currency pays no interest. Then Mt−1 is
the beginning-of-period money stock in period t. Let ϕtMt−1 denote the nominal fee charged by
the government in market 3 of period t to participate in the bond market. We define the nominal
fee as being proportional to the aggregate money stock for mathematical ease. If ϕt < 0, the
government collects a positive fee from households to access the bond market and if ϕt > 0, then
the government is actually paying households to use the bond market. The change in the money
stock in period t is given by
Mt =Mt−1 +ΩtϕtMt−1 +Bt−1 − ρtBt (5)
where Ωt ∈ [0, 1] is the measure of households who choose to pay the fee in t. Given our assumptions
that the government does not purchase goods or levy taxes, (5) is the government’s temporal budget
constraint. If Ωt = 1, then all households pay the fee and ϕt can be interpreted as the fraction of
the aggregate money stock that is withdrawn from the economy from payment of fees. The total
change in the money stock is comprised of two components: first, the net difference between the
cash created to redeem bonds, Bt−1, and the net cash withdrawal from selling Bt units of bonds
12Note that there can be no pairwise deviations since agents are anonymous and cannot commit to honoring
inter-temporal promises. For example, the following deviation is not possible: 1) agent i pays the fee, 2) i collects
money from agent j to buy bonds while promising to payback the value of the bonds in market 3. Agent i would
always renege on the promise and j cannot force redemption. If such a deviation were possible, then money would
not be essential for goods trades in market 2.
13One could consider having a fee to access the inside bond market as well. Since we assume free entry of
intermediaries in the inside bond economy, this fee would be driven to zero.
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at the price ρt; second, the cash withdrawn from households who pay the fee ϕt to access the bond
markets.14 A government policy is a sequence {Mt, Bt, ϕt}∞t=1 that satisfies (5) given the initial
values M0, B0 > 0.
Inside bond economy In the model with inside bonds, the government only controls the amount
of fiat currency in the economy. In this case, the government can only inject lump-sum transfers
of money, τ tMt−1, to households. As a result, the money stock evolves as
Mt = (1 + τ t)Mt−1. (6)
We assume that these lump-sum transfers of cash are only given to households who participate in
the financial markets and the transfer is received in market 3. Since all exchange must be voluntary,
a government policy is a sequence {τ t ≥ 0}∞t=1 given an initial value M0 > 0.
4 Outside bonds
In this section, we analyze the economy with outside bonds. For notational ease, variables corre-
sponding to the next period are indexed by +1, and variables corresponding to the previous period
are indexed by −1. The money price of goods in market 3 is P , implying that the goods price of
money in market 3 is φ = 1/P . Let p be the money price of goods in market 2; a the money price
of bonds in market 1; and ρ the money price of newly issued bonds in market 3.
4.1 Firm choices
Sellers produce market 2 goods with linear cost c (q) = q and consume in market 3 obtaining linear
utility U(y) = y. It is straightforward to show that that firms are indifferent as to how much they
sell in market 2 if
pφ = 1. (7)
14We want to emphasize that we do not impose a lump-sum tax. The difference is that the government’s lack of
enforcement power limits the revenue it can collect with the fee since households do not have to pay the fee. See
Andolfato (2009).
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Since we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, we assume that all firms produce the same amount.
With regard to bond holdings, it is straightforward to show that, in equilibrium, firms are indifferent
to holding any bonds if the Fisher equation holds and will hold not bonds if the yield on the bonds
does not compensate them for inflation or time discounting. Thus, for brevity of analysis, we
assume firms carry no bonds or money from market 3 to the next market 1.
4.2 Household choices
In what follows we first characterize a household’s choices under the assumption that it pays the fee
ϕM−1 and therefore has access to the financial market. We then characterize the optimal choices
for a deviating household that does not pay the fee. This allows us to derive the set of fees for
which it is individually rational to participate in the financial market.
Let V (m, b) be the expected value from entering market 3 with m units of fiat money and b
units of nominal government bonds at time t. Let qε denote the quantity consumed by a type ε
household in market 2 and yε the quantity of government bonds bought by a household of type ε in
market 1. Then, in the third market, the problem of a representative household in period t− 1 is:
V−1 (m−1, b−1) = max
x−,h−,m,b,{qε,yε}
U (x−1)− h−1
+β
Z εH
0
[εu(qε) + V (m− ayε − pqε, b+ yε)] dF (ε)
subject to constraints
x−1 + φ−1
¡
m+ ρ−1b
¢
= h−1 + φ−1 (m−1 + b−1 + τ−1M−2) (8)
m− ayε ≥ 0 ∀ε (9)
b+ yε ≥ 0 ∀ε (10)
m− ayε − pqε ≥ 0 ∀ε (11)
Constraint (8) is the t − 1 budget constraint in market 3; constraints (9) and (10) are the period
t short-selling constraints on money and bonds in market 1; while (11) is the period t money
constraint for purchasing goods in market 2. Note that households choose m and b in t− 1 before
the realization of the period t shock ε. Given these choices of m and b, households then choose the
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state-contingent values {qε, yε}.
Using the market 3 constraint to eliminate h−1 we get the following program
V−1 (m−1, b−1) = max
x−1,b,m,{qε,yε}
U (x−1)− x−1 + φ−1 (m−1 + b−1 + τ−1M−2)− φ−1
¡
m+ ρ−1b
¢
(12)
+β
Z εH
0
[εu(qε) + V (m− ayε − pqε, b+ yε)] dF (ε)
s.t. (9) - (11)
The envelope conditions are
V m−1−1 (m−1, b−1) = V
b−1
−1 (m−1, b−1) = φ−1 (13)
Let βφμε, βφθε, and βφλε denote the multipliers on (9), (10), and (11), respectively. Using (7) and
(13) the first-order conditions are
x−1 : 0 = U 0 (x−1)− 1
b : 0 = −φ−1ρ−1 + φβ + φβ
Z εH
0
θεdF (ε)
m : 0 = −φ−1 + φβ + φβ
Z εH
0
μεdF (ε) + φβ
Z εH
0
λεdF (ε)
qε : 0 = εu0(qε)− 1− λε ∀ε
yε : 0 = 1− a− aμε + θε − aλε ∀ε
It is straightforward to show that in any monetary equilibrium με = 0 and λε > 0 for all ε > 0.
This follows from the fact that households will never sell all their money for bonds nor will they
ever carry money (and forgo interest-bearing bonds) that will not be spent on market 2 goods. It
then follows from these expressions that the remaining multipliers are
λε = εu0(qε)− 1 and θε = aεu0(qε)− 1.
The last expression implies that for θε > 0, the ε household is constrained by its bond holdings;
i.e., it sells all of its bonds for money to acquire goods in market 2. When θε = 0, the ε household
trades off the interest payment on the bond to the marginal liquidity value of having an extra dollar
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in market 2. In short, it may sell some of its bonds but not all of them or it actually buys bonds
with some of its extra cash. Whether or not this constraint is binding for all households or only
for a fraction of households drives the equilibrium allocation.
Using these expressions in the first-order conditions for b and m and rearranging yields
φ−1ρ−1/a = φβ
Z εH
0
εu0(qε)dF (ε) (14)
φ−1 = φβ
Z εH
0
εu0(qε)dF (ε) . (15)
With regard to consumption in market 3, we get U 0 (x) = 1 in all t. With regard to consumption
in market 2, because a household’s desired consumption is increasing in ε, there is a critical value
for the taste index ε˜ such that if ε ≤ ε˜, θε˜ = 0 and if ε ≥ ε˜, θε˜ ≥ 0. For ε ≤ ε˜, qε solves
aεu0(qε) = 1 ∀ε ≤ ε˜ (16)
If ε = ε˜, the critical household sells all its bonds in market 1 and spends all its money in market 2 to
acquire q˜ε˜ units of goods. It then follows that households with ε ≥ ε˜ also consume q˜ε˜. Accordingly,
in market 2 a household’s consumption satisfies
qε =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u0−1 [1/ (aε)] if ε ≤ ε˜
u0−1 [1/ (aε˜)] if ε ≥ ε˜
(17)
Note from (16) that for those households that are unconstrained, the marginal utility of consumption
is equalized. Given these consumption choices and the pricing conditions, we get the following bond
demands:
yε ∈ [−b,m/a] if ε ≤ ε˜
yε = −b if ε ≥ ε˜.
(18)
4.3 Equilibrium
We focus on symmetric stationary equilibria where households participate in the financial market
and money is used as a medium of exchange. Such equilibria meet the following requirements: (i)
Households’ decisions solve the maximization problem (12); (ii) The decisions are symmetric across
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all households with the same preference shocks; (iii) The goods and bond markets clear; (iv) All
real quantities are constant across time; (v) The law of motion for the stock of money (5) holds in
each period.
Point (iv) requires that the real stock of money is constant; i.e., φM−1 = φ+1M . This implies
that φ/φ+1 = M/M−1 ≡ γ where γ is the gross steady-state money growth rate.15 Symmetry
requires m = M−1 and b = B−1. The restriction that there is a positive demand for money and
bonds requires that the following pricing relationship holds in equilibrium:
ρ−1 = a (19)
This relationship comes from (14) and (15). It implies that the bond price has to be the same
between market 3 and market 1 in period +1. Moreover, in a stationary equilibrium the bonds
price a has to be constant. This can be seen for example from (16), where a changing a involves
a non-stationary path for consumption. One can show that a constant bond price implies that the
bond-money ratio, respectively the growth rates of money and bonds, have to be equal and that ϕ
is constant.16
We assume there are positive initial stocks of money M0 and outside bonds B0.17 Assuming
that all households pay the fee, Ωt = 1, the low of motion for money holdings (5) can be written
as follows
B0
M0
=
γ − (1 + ϕ)
1− aγ (20)
From this equation the government has two independent policy instruments. We study the case
where the government chooses the fee ϕ and the gross growth rate of the money supply γ which
requires that the initial bonds ratio satisfies (20).
15Note that we consider the beginning-of-period nominal stock of money and deflate it by the end-of-period price
of goods.
16The proof of this claim is available by request.
17Since the assets are nominal objects, the government can start the economy off by one-time injections of cash
M0 and bonds B0.
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Market clearing in market 1 and market 2 requires
Z εH
0
yεdF (ε) = 0 (21)
qs −
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε) = 0 (22)
where qs is aggregate production by firms. Note that since the entire stock of money is held by the
households that then spend it all in market 2, aggregate production in market 2 is equal to the real
stock of money; i.e., qs = φM−1.
Finally, the requirement that households participate in the financial market imposes a lower
bound ϕM−1. In the proof of Proposition 1 we show that the participation constraint requires
that the difference between the expected discounted utility of a household that participates and
the expected discounted utility of a household that does not participate in the financial market is
non-negative. This condition is summarized by the function P (ε˜, a, γ) ≥ 0, where P only depends
on the gross growth rate of money γ, the endogenous cutoff value ε˜, and the bonds price a.
The equilibrium can be of two types. Either some households are constrained in market 1; i.e.
θε > 0 for ε ≥ ε˜, or none are constrained.
Proposition 1 For the outside bond economy, an unconstrained equilibrium is a policy (γ, ϕ) and
endogenous variables (a, ε˜) that satisfy
γ − (1 + ϕ)
γ/β − (1 + ϕ) ≥
Z εH
0
£
1− u0−1 (εH/ε)
¤
dF (ε) (23)
ε˜ = εH (24)
a = β/γ (25)
P (εH , β/γ, γ) ≥ 0. (26)
Equation (25) is obtained by using aεu0(qε) = 1 for all ε in (15) while (23) comes from the
budget constraint of the household with the largest preference shock. It reflects the fact that an
εH household must have enough funds to buy qH where qH solves aεHu0(qH) = 1.
In order to verify whether an unconstrained equilibrium exists for a given policy (γ, ϕ), one
needs only to check the participation constraint (26) and the equilibrium condition (23). If both
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hold, the asset price is a = β/γ and the critical value is ε˜ = εH . All remaining endogenous variables
can then be calculated as follows. From (17), consumption satisfies qε = u0−1 [γ/ (βε)] and from
(22) production and the real stock of money is qs = φM−1 =
R εH
0 qεdF (ε). Finally, from (20), we
get a bonds-to-money ratio that is consistent with the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 For the outside bond economy, a constrained equilibrium is a policy (γ, ϕ) and
endogenous variables (a, ε˜) that satisfy
γ − (1 + ϕ)
a−1 − (1 + ϕ) =
Z ε˜
0
£
1− u0−1 (ε˜/ε)
¤
dF (ε) (27)
ε˜ < εH (28)
γa− β
β
=
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) (29)
P (ε˜, a, γ) ≥ 0. (30)
Equation (29) is obtained by using aεu0(qε) = 1 for all ε ≤ ε˜ and aε˜u0(q˜ε) = 1 for all ε ≥ ε˜ in
(15). Equation (27) comes from the budget constraint of the critical household which has preference
shock ε˜ ≤ εH . It reflects the fact that all households ε ≥ ε˜ must have enough funds to buy q˜ε.
In order to verify whether a constrained equilibrium exists for a given policy ϕ and γ, one first
derives a and ε˜ by solving (27) and (29). Then one needs to check the participation constraint
(30) and the equilibrium condition ε˜ < εH . Other endogenous variables can then be derived from
(17), (20) and (22). If (30) is satisfied, then Ω = 1 and all agents participate in the bond market.
Otherwise, Ω = 0.
An interesting result is the different interest rate prevailing in each equilibrium. In the un-
constrained equilibrium, the nominal interest rate satisfies the Fisher equation, 1 + i = γ/β =
(1 + π) (1 + r). In the constrained equilibrium, the interest rate on bonds, 1 + i = 1/a < γ/β, is
lower than the value satisfying the Fisher equation. This implies that bonds in the constrained
equilibrium are ‘bad’ stores of value; i.e., no household would buy one in market 3 with the inten-
tion of simply holding it to the next market 3. In short, the marginal liquidity value of bonds from
relaxing households’ cash constraints increases the bonds price and hence reduces its return below
the risk-free rate.18
18Note that an econometrician that would observe the interest rate of an constrained economy would infer that
the risk-free rate is too low and conclude that there is a risk-free rate puzzle. A similar point has been made by Lagos
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From Propositions 1 and 2 it is evident that the government’s choice of γ and ϕ affects which
equilibrium occurs. Given ϕ, define γ¯ (ϕ) as the value of γ such that ε˜ = εH and let Θ ≡ 1 −R εH
0 u
0−1 (εH/ε) dF (ε). We then have the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 For a given policy (ϕ, γ), there exists a unique 1 < γ¯ (ϕ) < ∞ if β > Θ. If
γ ≥ γ¯ (ϕ) and P (εH , a, γ) ≥ 0, then a unique unconstrained equilibrium exists, and if γ ≤ γ¯ (ϕ)
and P (ε˜, a, γ) ≥ 0, a unique constrained equilibrium exists.
The essence of this proposition is that for sufficiently low inflation rates, high ε households
will face binding constraints on bond sales, and so aεu0(qε) > 1. In contrast, for sufficiently high
inflation rates, all households are constrained, implying aεu0(qε) = 1 for all ε.
Essential Illiquid Bonds Note that, if a < 1, then illiquid outside bonds are essential since they
improve the allocation relative to the money-only economy. This follows from two features of the
equilibrium allocation. First, at a = 1, from (16) we have εu0(qε) = 1, so unconstrained households
are consuming the first-best quantity while constrained households are away from the first-best.
By reducing a marginally, the consumption of the unconstrained households falls since they sell
some of their real balances for interest-bearing bonds. But the first-order welfare loss from this
reduction in consumption is zero due to standard envelope arguments. By shifting real balances
to constrained households, their consumption increases and since they are away from the first-best
consumption, this generates a first-order welfare gain. Second, from (29), we see that a reduction
in a from 1 causes ε˜ to increase. This means fewer households are constrained, so the marginal
utility of consumption is equated across more households. Thus, the distribution of consumption
is improved. As a result, these two effects imply that welfare is higher when bonds are illiquid and
a < 1.
Thus, raising γ marginally above 1 makes a < 1 and generates a welfare gain. In short, by
creating illiquid, interest-bearing bonds, households with idle cash can trade them for bonds and
reduce their exposure to the inflation tax. As a result the real value of money increases as does
consumption and welfare. This confirms that Kocherlakota’s (2003) result can be extended to
stationary, inflationary economies.
(2008).
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5 Inside Bonds
In this section, we analyze the model with inside bonds. In market 1, low ε households can use their
idle cash balances to acquire nominal bonds from the financial intermediary, which are redeemed
in market 3. High ε households can issue nominal bonds to the financial intermediary and redeem
them in market 3. Inside bonds are perfectly divisible, and one inside bond pays off 1 unit of fiat
currency in market 3. Let a denote the market 1 price of these inside bonds.19
5.1 Household choices
Let V (m, y) be the expected value from entering market 3 with m units of fiat money and y units
nominal bonds at time t. Let qε denote the quantity consumed by a type ε household in market 2
and yε the quantity of inside bonds bought by a household of type ε in market 1. Let b denote the
maximal amount of bonds that a household can issue in market 1. Then, in the third market, the
problem of a representative household in period t− 1 is:
V−1 (m−1, y−1) = max
x−1,m,{qε,yε}
U (x−1)− x−1 − φ−1m+ φ−1 (m−1 + y−1) + τ−1M−2 (31)
+β
Z εH
0
[εu(qε) + V (m− ayε − pqε, yε)] dF (ε)
subject to constraints
m− ayε ≥ 0 ∀ε (32)
b+ yε ≥ 0 ∀ε (33)
m− ayε − pqε ≥ 0 ∀ε (34)
Constraint (32) is the period t short-selling constraint on money; constraint (33) is the borrowing
constraint; while (34) is the period t money constraint for purchasing goods in market 2. Note
that households choose m in t− 1 before the realization of the period t shock ε. Given the choice
of m households then choose the state-contingent values {qε, yε}. Except for the choice of outside
bonds in market 3, the two maximization problems (12) and (31) are equivalent. Consequently, the
19One-period contracts are optimal here due to the quasi-linearity of preferences. In short, linearity of utility in
hours worked means there are no welfare gains from smoothing market 3 labor across time to repay current debt.
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first-order conditions (15)-(18) continue to hold in the inside bond economy.
Nevertheless, problem (31) differs in one important aspect from problem (12). In the inside
bond economy, the borrowing constraint (33) limits the amount of credit that a household can
get. Although the households take this constraint as exogenous, in equilibrium it is endogenously
determined. The corresponding constraint in the outside bond economy is the short-selling con-
straint (10). The crucial difference is that in the outside bond economy b is a choice variable of the
household while in the inside bond economy b is determined by the financial intermediary which
calculates the maximal loan that a household is willing to pay back in market 3.
5.2 Stationary equilibria
We focus on symmetric stationary equilibria where households participate in the financial market
and money is used as medium exchange. Such an equilibrium meets the following requirements:
(i) Households’ decisions solve the maximization problems specified above; (ii) The decisions are
symmetric across all households with the same preference shocks; (iii) The goods and bond markets
clear; (iv) All real quantities are constant across time. (v) The government budget constraint (6)
holds in each period.
As for the outside bonds economy, point (iv) requires that the real stock of money is constant
implying φ/φ+1 = M/M−1 = (1 + τ) ≡ γ. Symmetry requires m = M−1. Market clearing in
market 1 and market 2 requires (21) and (22) to hold. Note also that since the entire stock of
money is held by the households that then spend it all in market 2, aggregate production in market
2 is equal to the real stock of money; i.e., qs = φM−1.
Finally, the requirement that households participate in the financial market imposes a lower
bound on yε. In the proof of Proposition 3 we show that an equilibrium requires that the difference
between the expected discounted utility of a household that repays and the expected discounted
utility of a household that does not repay is non-negative. This condition is summarized by the
function R (ε˜, a, γ) ≥ 0, where R only depends on policy γ, the endogenous cutoff value ε˜, and the
bonds price a.
The equilibrium can be of two types. Either some households are constrained in market 1 or
none are constrained.
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Proposition 4 For the inside bond economy, an unconstrained equilibrium is a policy γ and en-
dogenous variables (a, ε˜) that satisfy
ε˜ = εH (35)
a = β/γ (36)
R (εH , β/γ, γ) ≥ 0. (37)
Equation (36) is obtained by using aεu0(qε) = 1 for all ε in (15) while (37) comes from the εH
household’s budget constraint. It reflects the fact that an εH household must have enough funds
to buy qH .
Proposition 5 For the inside bond economy, a constrained equilibrium is a policy γ and endoge-
nous variables (a, ε˜) that satisfy
ε˜ < εH (38)
γa− β
β
=
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) (39)
R (ε˜, a, γ) = 0. (40)
Equation (39) is obtained by using aεu0(qε) = 1 for all ε ≤ ε˜ and aε˜u0(q˜ε) = 1 for all ε ≥ ε˜
in (15). Equation (40) comes from the budget constraint of the critical household with preference
shock ε˜. It reflects the fact that all households ε ≥ ε˜ must have enough funds to buy q˜ε.
In any equilibrium with a < 1, inside bonds are essential. The reasoning is the same as in
Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007); Iinterest bearing inside bonds allow households to earn
interest on money. This makes money more valuable, thereby raising φ and consumption.
As was the case in the outside bond economy, the nominal interest rate satisfies the Fisher
equation, 1 + i = γ/β = (1 + π) (1 + r) in the unconstrained equilibrium. When households are
credit-constrained, the interest rate on inside bonds, 1 + i = 1/a < γ/β, is lower than the value
satisfying the Fisher equation. In short, when households are credit-constrained, interest rates have
to be low to induce repayment. This result is similar to that found by Alvarez and Jermann (2000)
and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009).
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6 Inside vs outside bonds
We can now state the main proposition of the paper.
Proposition 6 For a given value of γ, if an equilibrium exists in the inside bond economy, then
ϕ can be chosen such that an equivalent equilibrium allocation exists in the outside bond economy.
The converse is not true.
The reason for this result is as follows. In the inside bond economy, the money growth rate is
the only policy instrument. Thus any equilibrium that exists in this economy for a given value of
γ can be replicated in the outside bond economy for the same γ by choosing ϕ in an appropriate
manner. If the choice of γ forces the inside bond economy to be borrowing-constrained (θε > 0
for some households), then by charging the maximum fee the government makes the participation
constraint (30) binding in exactly the same way that the borrowing constraint (40) is binding.
The multiplicity of policy instruments in the outside bond economy is what drives the converse
part of the proposition — in the inside bond economy the government only has γ as a policy
instrument to affect the allocation. So in general, it is not possible to replicate the allocation
occurring in the outside bond economy via a choice of γ alone.
The main point of the proposition is that by choosing policies in a particular way, the allocations
in the two economies are equivalent. The remaining question is whether or not the optimal policy
in each economy generates equivalent allocations.
6.1 Optimal Policy
There are two inefficiencies in this economy that policy must try to overcome. First, when ε˜ <
εH , there is an inefficient allocation of consumption across households since some households are
constrained while others are not. As a result, the marginal utilities of consumption are not equalized.
This is an extensive margin inefficiency. Second, due to the time cost of holding money, the
quantities consumed by all households are inefficiently low if γ > β. This is an intensive margin
inefficiency.
Keeping in mind these two inefficiencies, we now characterize the optimal policy in both
economies.
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Proposition 7 In either economy, it is optimal to set γ such that ε˜ < εH .
The proof is a straightforward application of the envelope theorem. In the unconstrained equi-
librium, the marginal utility of consumption is equalized across all households. It then follows that
the only inefficiency is from qε being too low when γ > β. Conjecture there is a value γ = γ¯ such
that ε˜ = εH . Now consider a marginal reduction in γ from γ¯ causing ε˜ < εH . The first-order loss
from reducing ε˜ below εH is zero, while there is a first-order gain from lowering inflation and raising
qε for all households. Hence, it is optimal to choose γ such that ε˜ < εH .
Given that it is optimal to have some households constrained, we have the following
Proposition 8 It is optimal to charge the maximum fee in the outside bond economy making the
households’ participation constraints binding. Consequently, the allocations are the same in both
economies for all γ. It then follows that the optimal value of γ is the same in both economies.
It is optimal for the government to charge the highest possible fee in the outside bond economy.
The reason is simple. Suppose the fee was such that the participation constraint is not binding.
Then it is possible to raise ϕ and lower γ such that the government budget constraint still holds and
the participation constraint is satisfied. By lowering γ, the cost of holding real balances is lower,
thereby raising qε for all households. As we stated earlier, this is just an application of standard
public finance theory — if lump-sum ‘taxes’ are available to the government, then it is optimal to
use them to reduce distortionary taxes. Since the participation fee is effectively a lump-sum tax,
the government can improve welfare by using it to the fullest extent and reduce the distortionary
tax on money.
By making the household’s participation constraint binding for γ < γ¯ (ϕmax) , the solutions to
(23)-(26) also solve (35)-(37) for the unconstrained economies and the solutions to (27)-(30) solve
(38)-(40) for the constrained economies.
The key point of this proposition is that even if a policy (ϕ, γ) can generate a different allocation
in the outside bond economy, those allocations are Pareto inferior to the ones achieved in the inside
bond economy.
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7 Conclusion
When households are liquidity-constrained, two options exist to relax this constraint: sell assets
or issue debt. We have analyzed and compared the welfare properties of these two options in a
model where households can either issue nominal inside bonds or sell nominal outside bonds. The
key assumption of our analysis is the absence of collection powers by private households and the
government. The following results emerged from our analysis. First, for any positive inflation rate,
bonds are essential in both economies, and thus generate societal benefits. Second, any allocation
attained in the economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy with outside bonds.
The converse is not true. Finally, under the optimal policies, the allocations in the two economies are
the same as are the optimal money growth rates. We also showed that the key element responsible
for these two economies to have equivalent allocations is a cost to participating in financial markets.
Thus, in a manner similar to the results of Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009), Andolfatto (2009) and
Hu, Kennan and Wallace (2009), participation constraints have serious ramifications for analyzing
allocations arising in monetary models.
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8 Appendix
Allocation for a household that does not participate in the financial market
For many of the proofs that follow we need to know the allocation of an agent who does not
participate in the financial market. Throughout the Appendix we indicate the choice variables of
a deviating household by a "ˆ".
It is straightforward to show that the quantities consumed by an agent who does not participate
in the financial market satisfy (41) and that the first-order condition for the choice of money holdings
satisfies (42):
qˆε =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u0−1 (1/ε) if ε ≤ εˆ
u0−1 (1/εˆ) if ε ≥ εˆ
(41)
φ−1 = φβ
Z εH
0
εu0(qˆε)dF (ε) , (42)
where 0 ≤ εˆ ≤ εH is the critical cutoff for a household that does not participate and qˆε are the
quantities it consumes. Dividing (42) by φβ and using (41), we can write (42) as follows:
γ − β
β
=
Z εH
εˆ
(ε/εˆ− 1) dF (ε) .
The right-hand side is decreasing in εˆ and approaches∞ as εˆ→ 0. The left-hand side is a constant
larger than 0 for γ > β. Accordingly, for any γ > β there exists a unique εˆ (γ) < εH . Finally, note
that a deviator brings in φmˆ = qˆεˆ units of money into a period and that expected consumptionR εH
0 qˆε (γ) dF (ε) and expected utility
R εH
0 εu [qˆε (γ)] dF (ε) depend via εˆ (γ) on γ only. We will use
these results to derive the participation constraints in the following proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof involves two steps. We first derive the participation
constraint. We then derive the equilibrium conditions (23) and (25).
STEP 1: Participation constraint
To derive the participation constraint, consider a household of type ε that enters mkt 3 in t and
that pays the fee in every period for all t. Its expected payoff in mkt 3 is
EV = U (x∗)− hε +
β
1− β
½Z εH
0
εu (qε) dF (ε) + U (x∗)−Eh
¾
,
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where hε are hours worked in the current period in mkt 3 if it pays the fee and Eh is expected
hours worked in future periods. Suppose a household deviates by not paying the fee in the current
and all future periods (we could also use the one-step deviation principle to arrive at the same
participation constraint). Since bx = x∗, a deviator’s expected discounted utility is
E bV = U (x∗)− bhε + β
1− β
½Z εH
0
εu (bqε) dF (ε) + U (x∗)−Ebh¾ .
It then follows that the participation constraint satisfies EV ≥ E bV which requires
hε − bhε ≤ β
1− β
Z εH
0
[εu (qε)− εu (bqε)] dF (ε) + β
1− β
³
Ebh−Eh´ . (43)
Deriving hε: On the equilibrium path, an ε household arrives in mkt 3 with m − ayε − pqε
money and b+ yε bonds that payoff one unit of money. It leaves mkt 3 with m+1 money and b+1
bonds. Accordingly, current hours worked on the equilibrium path are
hε = x∗ + φ (m+1 + ab+1)− φτM−1 − φ (m− ayε − pqε)− φ (b+ yε) . (44)
Deriving hˆε: On the equilibrium path, an ε household arrives in mkt 3 with m − ayε − pqε
money and b+ yε bonds. If the household deviates by not paying the fee, it leaves mkt 3 with mˆ+1
money and no bonds. Accordingly, current hours worked by a deviator are
hˆε = x∗ + φmˆ+1 − φ (m− ayε − pqε)− φ (b+ yε) .
The difference in current hours worked hε − hˆε is
hε − hˆε = −φτM−1 + φ (m+1 + ab+1)− φmˆ+1. (45)
Deriving E (h): To derive E (h) we integrate (44) to get
Eh =
Z εH
0
hεdF (ε) = x∗ + φ (m+1 + ab+1 −m− b− τM−1) +
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε) ,
since market clearing implies
R εH
0 yεdF (ε) = 0 and φp = 1. In equilibrium, m+1 =M and b+1 = B.
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Using the government’s budget constraint (5), and market clearing qs =
R εH
0 qεdF (ε) yields
Ehε =
Z εH
0
hεdF (ε) = x∗ + qs.
Deriving E
³
hˆ
´
: In the future a deviator holds mˆ− pqˆε units of money arriving in mkt 3 and
leaves with mˆ+1. A deviator’s mkt 3 hours are then
bhε = x∗ + φ (mˆ+1 − mˆ) + qˆε.
So its expected hours worked are
Ebh = Z εH
0
bhεdF (ε) = x∗ + φ (mˆ+1 − mˆ) + qˆs.
where qˆs ≡
R εH
0 qˆεdF (ε). Thus the difference in expected hours worked is
Ebh−Eh = φ (mˆ+1 − mˆ) + qˆs − qs. (46)
Maximal fee: Using (45) and (46), we can write the participation constraint (43) as follows
−φϕM−1 + φ (m+1 + ab+1)− φmˆ+1 ≤
βΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
β
1− βφ (mˆ+1 − mˆ) ,
where Ψ (qε, qˆε) ≡
R εH
0 {[εu (qε)− qε]− [εu (qˆε)− qˆε]} dF (ε). Use the deviator’s critical consump-
tion φmˆ = qˆεˆ to get
−φϕM−1 ≤ −φ (m+1 + ab+1) +
βΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
γ − β
1− β qˆεˆ. (47)
Finally, use the critical agent’s budget constraint to substitute φ (m+1 + ab+1) by γq˜ε to get the
maximal fee Φmax
−φϕM−1 ≤ Φmax ≡ −γq˜ε +
βΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
γ − β
1− β qˆεˆ.
Participation constraint: To derive the participation constraint, use (20) to replace −φϕM−1 in
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(47) to get
φ (M−1 +B−1)− φγ (M−1 + aB−1) ≤ −γq˜ε +
βΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
γ − β
1− β qˆεˆ.
From the critical agent’s budget we have q˜ε = φM−1 + aφb ≤ φM−1 + aφB−1. Since γq˜ε −
γφ (M−1 + aB−1) ≤ 0, a sufficient condition for the participation constraint to hold is
φM−1 + φB−1 ≤
βΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
γ − β
1− β qˆεˆ.
Finally, replace φB−1 from the budget constraint of the critical agent q˜ε = φM−1 + aφB−1 and
replace φM−1 by
R εH
0 qεdF (ε) to get
0 ≤ P (ε˜, a, γ) ≡ (1− a)
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε) +
aβΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
a (γ − β)
1− β qˆεˆ − q˜ε. (48)
Since from (17) qε depends on a only, and, as shown in Step 2, bqε depends on γ only, the right-hand
side can be summarized by the function P (ε˜, a, γ) which depends on γ, the asset price a, and the
critical cutoff value ε˜ only.
Finally, in the unconstrained equilibrium we have a = β/γ and ε˜ = εH and so we get (26):
0 ≤ P (εH , β/γ, γ) ≡
γ − β
β
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε) +
βΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
γ − β
1− β qˆεˆ −
γ
β
qH .
Thus, the participation constraint is satisfied if P (εH , β/γ, γ) ≥ 0.
STEP 2: Equilibrium conditions
To derive (25), divide (15) by φβ, substitute φ−1/φ by γ, and substitute εu0(qε) by 1/a to get
γa/β = 1.
Equilibrium condition (23) is derived from εH household’s budget constraint pqH ≤M−1+aB−1.
If we multiply it by φ, we can write it as follows:
qH ≤ φM−1
µ
1 + a
B−1
M−1
¶
.
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We next use the government’s budget constraint (5) to substitute B−1/M−1 to get the following
expression:
qH ≤ φM−1
µ
1− a (1 + τ)
1− aγ
¶
.
Use the market clearing condition (22) to substitute φM−1 = qs =
R εH
0 qεdF (ε), divide by qH , and
rearrange to get
a [γ − a (1 + ϕ)]
1− a (1 + ϕ) ≥
Z εH
0
(1− qε/qH) dF (ε) .
Finally, use (17) to substitute all qε and substitute a by β/γ to get (23):
γ − (1 + ϕ)
γ/β − (1 + ϕ) ≥
Z εH
0
£
1− u0−1 (εH/ε)
¤
dF (ε) .
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof involves two steps. We first derive the participation
constraint. We then derive the equilibrium conditions (27) and (29).
STEP 1: Participation constraint
The derivation of the participation constraint is equal to STEP 1 of the previous proof. From
(48), the participation constraint satisfies (30):
0 ≤ P (ε˜, a, γ) ≡ (1− a)
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε) +
aβΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
a (γ − β)
1− β qˆεˆ − q˜ε.
Since from (17) qε depends on a only, and bqε depends on γ only, the right-hand side can be
summarized by the function P (ε˜, a, γ) which depends on γ, the asset price a, and the critical cutoff
value ε˜ only.
STEP 1: Equilibrium conditions
To derive (29), divide (15) by φβ, substitute φ−1/φ by γ, and use (17) to substitute u0 (qε) to
get:
γ/β =
Z ε˜
0
(1/a) dF (ε) +
Z εH
ε˜
(1/a) (ε/ε˜) dF (ε) .
Finally, multiply by a and rewrite it to get (29).
The equilibrium condition (27) is derived from the critical household’s budget constraint pq˜ε =
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M−1 + aB−1. If we multiply the budget constraint by φ, we can write it as follows
q˜ε = φM−1
µ
1 + a
B−1
M−1
¶
.
We next use the government’s budget constraint (5) to substitute B−1/M−1 =
γ−(1+τ)
1−aγ to get
q˜ε = φM−1
µ
1− a (1 + ϕ)
1− aγ
¶
.
Use the market clearing condition φM−1 =
R εH
0 qεdF (ε) to substitute φM−1 and divide by q˜εto get
1 =
∙
1− a (1 + ϕ)
1− aγ
¸ ∙Z ε˜
0
(qε/q˜ε − 1) dF (ε) + 1
¸
.
Use (17) to substitute all qε and rearrange to get (27):
γ − (1 + ϕ)
1/a− (1 + ϕ) =
Z ε˜
0
£
1− u0−1 (ε˜/ε)
¤
dF (ε) .
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof involves two steps. First, we derive γ¯ (τ). Then we show
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
STEP 1: Derivation of γ¯ (τ)
If all households are unconstrained, we have pqε ≤ M−1 + aB−1 for all ε. Then, γ¯ (τ) is the
value of γ that solves pqH = M−1 + aB−1. In the proof of Proposition 1, we have shown that we
can write pqH ≤M−1 + aB−1 as follows
γ − (1 + ϕ)
γ/β − (1 + ϕ) ≥ Φ (49)
where Θ ≡
R εH
0
£
1− u0−1 (εH/ε)
¤
dF (ε) is a constant with Θ ∈ [0, 1]. The left-hand side is in-
creasing in γ and equal to 0 at γ = ϕ + 1. Moreover, it approaches β for γ → ∞. Accordingly,
there exists a unique 1 + ϕ < γ¯ (ϕ) < ∞ that solves (49) if β > Φ. If β < Φ, the unconstrained
equilibrium does not exist.
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The critical value γ¯ (ϕ) satisfies
γ¯ (ϕ) =
β (1 + ϕ) (1− Φ)
β − Φ .
Accordingly, for a given policy (ϕ, γ) if γ ≥ γ¯ (ϕ), the asset price a and the cutoff value ε˜ satisfy
Proposition 1. If γ ∈ [1, γ¯ (ϕ)], then the asset price a and the cutoff value ε˜ satisfy Proposition 2.
Consider γ ≥ γ¯ (ϕ). Then ε˜ = εH and a = β/γ so existence and uniqueness follows trivially.
Consider γ ≤ γ¯ (ϕ). For convenience, we replicate the two equations that solve for the asset
price a and the critical value ε˜:
γ − (1 + ϕ)
a−1 − (1 + ϕ) =
Z ε˜
0
£
1− u0−1 (ε˜/ε)
¤
dF (ε) (50)
aγ − β
β
=
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) . (51)
Equation (51) is decreasing in (ε˜, a) space with a = β/γ at ε˜ = εH . Equation (50) is increasing in
(ε˜, a) space. Moreover, at ε˜ = εH , we have a ≥ β/γ. To see this, evaluate (50) at ε˜ = εH to get
γ − (1 + ϕ)
a−1 − (1 + ϕ) = Θ.
If we solve this equation for a, we get
a =
Θ
γ + (Θ− 1) (1 + ϕ) .
Then a ≥ β/γ implies
γ ≤ γ¯ (τ) = β (1 + ϕ) (1−Θ)
β −Θ ,
which is true since by assumption γ ≤ γ¯ (ϕ). Hence, for γ ≤ γ¯ (ϕ) there exists a unique (a, ε˜) that
solves (50) and (51) with a ∈ [β/γ, 1] and ε˜ ≤ εH .
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof involves two steps. We first derive the maximal loan that
a household can get. We then derive the equilibrium conditions (36) and (37).
STEP 1: Maximal loan
To derive the maximal loan, consider a household of type ε that enters mkt 3 in t and repays
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the loan in every period for all t. Its expected payoff in mkt 3 is
EV = U (x∗)− hε +
β
1− β
½Z εH
0
εu (qε) dF (ε) + U (x∗)−Eh
¾
,
where hε are hours worked in the current period in mkt 3 if it repays the loan and Eh is expected
hours worked in future periods. Suppose a household deviates by not repaying in the current and all
future periods (we could also use the one-step deviation principle to arrive at the same participation
constraint). Since bx = x∗ a deviator’s expected discounted utility is
E bV = U (x∗)− bhε + β
1− β
½Z εH
0
εu (bqε) dF (ε) + U (x∗)−Ebh¾ .
It then follows that the participation constraint satisfies EV ≥ E bV which requires
hε − bhε ≤ β
1− β
Z εH
0
[εu (qε)− εu (bqε)] dF (ε) + β
1− β
³
Ebh−Eh´ . (52)
Deriving hε: On the equilibrium path, an ε household arrives in mkt 3 withm−ayε−pqε money
and yε bonds. It receives the transfer τM−1 and it leaves mkt 3 with m+1 money. Accordingly,
current hours worked on the equilibrium path are
hε = x∗ + φm+1 − τM−1 − φ [m− ayε − pqε]− φyε. (53)
Deriving hˆε: On the equilibrium path, an ε household arrives in mkt 3 with m − ayε − pqε
money and yε bonds. If the household deviates by not repaying the loan, it leaves mkt 3 with mˆ+1.
Note that it gets no lump-sum transfer from the government.20 Accordingly, current hours worked
by a deviator are
hˆε = x∗ + φmˆ+1 − φ [m− ayε − pqε] .
The difference in current hours worked hε − hˆε is
hε − hˆε = φ (m+1 − mˆ+1)− τφM−1 − φyε. (54)
20We could assume that all lump-sum transfers are paid out in mkt 1 so that a necessary requirement to get the
transfers is participation in financial markets. This assumption would generate the same borrowing constraint.
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Deriving E (h): To derive E (h) we integrate (53) to get
Eh =
Z εH
0
hεdF (ε) = x∗ + φ [m+1 −m− τM−1] +
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε) .
since market clearing implies
R εH
0 yεdF (ε) = 0 and φp = 1. In equilibrium m+1 = M . Using the
government budget constraint (6), and market clearing qs =
R εH
0 qεdF (ε) yields
Eh =
Z εH
0
hεdF (ε) = x∗ + qs.
Deriving E
³
hˆ
´
: In the future a deviator holds mˆ− pqˆε units of money arriving in mkt 3 and
leaves the market with mˆ+1. A deviator’s mkt 3 hours are then
bhε = x∗ + φ (mˆ+1 − mˆ) + qˆε.
So his expected hours worked are
Ebh = Z εH
0
bhεdF (ε) = x∗ + φ (mˆ+1 − mˆ) + qˆs.
where qˆs ≡
R εH
0 qˆεdF (ε). Thus the difference in expected hours worked is
Ebh−Eh = φ (mˆ+1 − mˆ) + qˆs − qs. (55)
Maximal Loan: Using (54) and (55), we can write the borrowing constraint (52) as follows
φ (m+1 − mˆ+1)− φyε − τM−1 ≤
βΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
β
1− βφ (mˆ+1 − mˆ) .
Use the deviator’s critical consumption qˆεˆ = φmˆ to get
φm+1 − φyε − τM−1 ≤
βΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
γ − β
1− β qˆεˆ.
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Then, since φm = φm+1 − τM−1 the maximal loan φb satisfies
−φyε ≤ φb ≡ −φm+
βΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
γ − β
1− β qˆεˆ. (56)
STEP 2: Equilibrium conditions
To derive (36), divide (15) by φβ, substitute φ−1/φ by γ, and substitute εu0(qε) by 1/a to get
γa/β = 1.
To derive (37) note that in the unconstrained equilibrium, the εH household must have enough
funds to pay for its consumption; i.e., qH ≤ φm+ aφb. Use (56) to substitute φb to get
qH ≤ (1− a)φm+
aβΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
γ − β
1− β qˆεˆ.
Finally, replace φm = φM−1 =
R εH
0 qεdF (ε)
0 ≤ (1− a)
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε) +
aβΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
a (γ − β)
1− β qˆεˆ − qH .
Since from (17) qε depends on a only, and, as shown in Step 2, qˆε depends on γ only, the right-hand
side can be summarized by the function R (εH , a, γ) which depends on policy γ and asset price a
only.
Finally, in the unconstrained equilibrium we have a = β/γ and ε˜ = εH and so we have
0 ≤ R (εH , β/γ, γ) ≡
γ − β
β
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε) +
βΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
γ − β
1− β qˆεˆ −
γ
β
qH . (57)
Thus, the participation constraint is satisfied if R (εH , β/γ, γ) ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof involves two steps. We first derive the maximal loan that
a household can get. We then derive the equilibrium conditions (39) and (40).
STEP 1: Maximal loan
The derivation of the maximal loan is equal to STEP 1 of the previous proof. From (56), the
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maximal loan satisfies
φb ≡ −φm+ βΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
γ − β
1− β qˆεˆ. (58)
STEP 2: Equilibrium conditions
To derive (39), divide (15) by φβ, substitute φ−1/φ by γ, and substitute εu0(qε) by 1/a to get
γa− β
β
=
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) .
To derive (40) note that in the constrained equilibrium, the εH household’s budget constraint
holds with equality; i.e., qH = φm+ aφb. Use (56) to substitute φb to get
qH = (1− a)φm+
aβΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
γ − β
1− β qˆεˆ.
Finally, replace φm = φM−1 =
R εH
0 qεdF (ε) to get (40):
0 = R (ε˜, a, γ) ≡ (1− a)
Z εH
0
qεdF (ε) +
aβΨ (qε, qˆε)
1− β +
a (γ − β)
1− β qˆεˆ − qH .
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider a policy γ such that an unconstrained equilibrium exists in
the inside bond economy. Then the equilibrium allocation satisfies
ε˜ = εH and a = β/γ,
with R (ε˜, a, γ) ≥ 0. Assume the same γ and the same real allocation is implemented in the outside
bond economy. Then, by comparing R (ε˜, a, γ) with P (ε˜, a, γ) it straightforward to see that
R (εH , a, γ) = P (εH , β/γ, γ) ≥ 0.
Finally, the value for ϕ in the outside bond economy that is consistent with this equilibrium must
satisfy
γ − (1 + ϕ)
γ/β − (1 + ϕ) ≥
Z ε˜
0
£
1− u0−1 (ε˜/ε)
¤
dF (ε) .
Now consider a policy γ such that a constrained equilibrium exists in the inside bond economy.
34
Then the equilibrium allocation satisfies
γa− β
β
=
Z εH
ε˜
³ε
ε˜
− 1
´
dF (ε) and R (ε˜, a, γ) = 0,
with ε˜ ≤ εH . Assume that the same real allocation is implemented in the outside bond economy.
Then, by comparing R (ε˜, a, γ) with P (ε˜, a, γ) it straightforward that
R (ε˜, a, γ) = P (ε˜, a, γ) = 0.
It remains to choose a value for ϕ in the inside bonds economy such that
γ − (1 + ϕ)
γ/β − (1 + ϕ) =
Z ε˜
0
£
1− u0−1 (ε˜/ε)
¤
dF (ε) .
Solving for ϕ yields
ϕ =
γ − 1− (γ/β − 1)
R ε˜
0
£
1− u0−1 (ε˜/ε)
¤
dF (ε)
1 +
R ε˜
0 [1− u0−1 (ε˜/ε)] dF (ε)
.
The converse is not true because there are policies (γ, ϕ) in the outside bond economy that
result in allocations that cannot be replicated in the inside bond economy.
Proof of Proposition 7. In equilibrium welfare is given by
(1− β)W =
Z εH
0
[εu (qε)− qε] dF (ε) + U (x∗)− x∗.
Conjecture there is a value γ¯ such at ε˜ = εH ; i.e., the highest household is just constrained. Consider
the change in welfare from a marginal increase in γ above γ¯:
(1− β) dW
dγ
¯¯¯¯
γ=γ¯
=
Z εH
0
£
εu0 (qε)− 1
¤ dqε
dγ
¯¯¯¯
γ=γ¯
dF (ε) .
At this value εu0 (qε) = 1/a for all ε, so we have
(1− β) dW
dγ
¯¯¯¯
γ=γ¯
=
Z εH
0
µ
1− a
a
¶
dqε
dγ
¯¯¯¯
γ=γ¯
dF (ε) .
Since a = β/γ < 1 at γ = γ¯, the sign of this derivative hinges on the sign of dqε/dγ. From the
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household’s FOC we have εu0 (qε) = γ/β with
dqε
dγ
=
β
εu00 (qε)
< 0.
It then follows that dWdγ
¯¯¯
γ=γ¯
< 0 so lowering γ to generate ε˜ < εH is welfare improving.
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider the outside bond economy in the constrained equilibrium.
Welfare is given by
(1− β)W =
Z ε˜
0
[εu (qε)− qε] dF (ε) +
Z εH
ε˜
[εu (qε˜)− qε˜] dF (ε) + U (x∗)− x∗.
The FOC wrt to γ yields
(1− β) dW
dγ
=
Z ε˜
0
£
εu0 (qε)− 1
¤ dqε
dγ
dF (ε) +
Z εH
ε˜
£
εu0 (qε˜)− 1
¤ dqε˜
dγ
dF (ε) .
For all households we have aεu0 (qε) ≥ 1 so the bracketed terms are positive. Thus, the sign of this
derivative hinges on the signs of dqε˜/dγ and dqε/dγ. For all ε ≤ ε˜, aεu0 (qε) = 1 which yields
dqε
dγ
= − εu
0 (qε)
aεu00 (qε)
da
dγ
(59)
dqε˜
dγ
= − ε˜u
0 (qε˜)
aεu00 (qε)
∂a
∂γ
− u
0 (qε˜)
εu00 (qε)
∂ε˜
∂γ
. (60)
If the fee is low enough that the participation constraint is not binding, then using (29) we obtain
∂a
∂γ
=
−γ
a
∂ε˜
∂γ
=
−a
β
R εH
ε˜
ε
ε˜2dF (ε)
,
hence
dqε
dγ
= − εu
0 (qε)
aεu00 (qε)
da
dγ
=
dqε
dγ
=
εu0 (qε)
aεu00 (qε)
γ
a
< 0
dqε˜
dγ
=
ε˜u0 (qε˜)
aεu00 (qε)
γ
a
+
u0 (qε˜)
εu00 (qε)
a
β
R εH
ε˜
ε
ε˜2 dF (ε)
< 0.
It then follows that raising ϕ and lowering γ improves welfare. Thus setting ϕ such that P (ε˜, a, γ) =
0 is optimal. It then follows from Proposition 6 that the allocations are equivalent and thus the
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optimal value of γ is the same in both economies.
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